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SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA: THE PATH TO HOME RULE 
Luis Moreno 
Introduction 
Scotland and Catalonia share a somewhat similar configuration as sub-
state peripheral nations with analogous perceptions, interpretations and 
aspirations for home rule within their respective British and Spanish 
frameworks. Nevertheless, Scotland and Catalonia have not followed 
parallel processes over the last decades, as far as the achievement of
institutional forms of self-government is concerned(!). 
The nationality of Catalonia at present enjoys a great degree of
political autonomy within the quasi-federal Spanish Estado de las 
Autonomias. On the contrary, and although in Scotland there is a wide 
constellation of political and social forces favouring Scottish home rule, the 
task of translating this common concern into action has proved in the last 
years to be extraordinarily difficult. 
It will be contended later on in this article than an inter-party political 
convention is the desirable option for the achievement of self-government 
in Scotland, although a change in the traditional political pattern of self-
interest and party competition characteristic of British politics is required
to achieve such a goal. 
It must be emphasized, however, that not only is it an absolute 
requirement that the Scots have a vision of self-government but that this 
vision must also be brought into the realm of the possible/probable through 
social mobilisation. 
Very similar to the approach of a majority of Catalans to the so-called 
"national question", non-secessionist self-government in Scotland bases its 
argument mainly on the following: 
(1) Scottish cultural, economic and political differences with the rest of
Britain, marked by an increased centre-periphery dichotomy in 
Britain. 
(2) Scottish dual nationality: one being the result of a reinforcement of the
pre-Union identity, and the other being the product of the national
integration brought about by British state-building after 1707. 
166 
(3) A desire for democratic political decentralisation related to a sense of 
national/regional consciousness. 
Scottish and Catalan Affinities and Differences 
In order to set out subsequent sections, it is first of all necessary to 
focus on the main historical, political, socio-cultural and economic 
affinities and differences between Scotland and Catalonia. They can be 
outlined as follows: 
(A) Historical12) 
Affinities. In pre-capitalist Europe, Scotland and Catalonia exercised 
significant political independence as ethnically structured territories. This 
continued until their personal dynastic unions with England and Castile, 
respectively (ie. James VI & I in 1603 and the Catholic Kings in 1469). 
Nevertheless, both nations continued to preserve institutional forms of self-
government until the coercive imposition of political standardization which 
occurred in the aftermath of a military defeat (ie. the failure oftheJacobites 
to reinstate the Stuarts in 1745 and the Catalans' setback in their support for 
Archduke Charles in the Spanish War of Succession in 1714). These events 
formed the basis of the origins of the processes of national integration and 
state-building which occurred in the United Kingdom and Spain during the 
18th and 19th centuries. 
In Scotland and Catalonia, during the second half of the 19th and the 
first half of the 20th centuries, there was a progressive reassertion of 
nationalist values with unfulfilled economic and social expectations, caused 
by the decline of the British Empire and the inability of the Spanish 
bourgeoisie to achieve its revolution nationwide. These political 
movements eventually forced concessions from the centre which, in order 
to accommodate them, granted a degree of administrative devolution, eg. 
the Secretaryship for Scotland in 1885 and the Mancomunitat de Catalunya 
in 1914. The creation of the Scottish Office in Edinburgh in 1939, and the 
achievement of the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, although different 
in political and institutional content, can be seen as outcomes of a similar 
political struggle for the gain of larger degrees of home rule. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, with the progressive obsolescence of the 
centralist state apparatus in liberal Britain and despotic Spain, the 
peripheral nationalism of Scotland and Catalonia challenged the political 
legitimation of the corporatist forms of uniformity imposed on them from 
the centre oftheir respective polities. With the 1979 Referenda in Scotland 
and Catalonia, the desire for self-government of a majority of Scots and 
Catalans was expressed (51.6% cent in Scotland and 88.1% in Catalonia in 
the turn-out). 
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Differences. While throughout the Middle Ages the Catalan-
Aragonese Confederation was one of the leading Mediterranean powers, 
Scotland continually struggled to overcome the "natural" expansionist 
interests of England in the Wars of Independence. (J) Both the out-looking 
Catalan and defensive Scottish psycho-social attitudes have somehow 
moulded the ancestral national character of the Catalans and Scots. More 
important, however, is the fact that when the nationalist movements 
emerged defiantly in the 1960s and 1970s, the ancestral detachment of their 
respective compound identities- ie. Scottish and Catalan, but at the same 
time British and Spanish too- reflected the assertive and reactive nature of 
their similar political aspirations for self-government. 
The main historical dissimilarity between both political processes in 
Scotland and Catalonia in contemporary times is that, during the Second 
Spanish Republic, the Catalans achieved democratic institutions of self-
government although the Statute of Autonomy and the Generalitat were 
later abolished by Franco in 1939 at the end of the Civil War. The Scots 
have not had any analogous experience. 
These divergent realities undoubtedly conditioned not only social 
mobilisation in Scotland and Catalonia prior to the 1979 Referenda but, 
more importantly, the form and content ofthe political response from the 
centre of both centralist states. 
It is, however, important to note that if the "memory" of the 
Republican Catalan Government and Parliament has counted as an 
extraordinary asset in the centre-periphery negotiation in the transitional 
period after the demise of Franco's dictatorship, the mere existence of an 
administrative Scottish Office since World War Two, in combination with 
the civil institutions preserved by the 1707 Treaty of Union, has also 
enhanced the subsequent salience of the Scottish dimension in British 
politics. 
(B) Political 
Affinities. Scotland and Catalonia have, in recent times, seen the rise 
of strong nationalist parties- the Scottish National Party and the coalition 
Convergencia i Uni6 - which have brought not only an element of 
hetereogeneity to the British and Spanish electoral scenarios but have also 
tested the adaptability of both liberal and post-despotic state apparatuses to 
profound institutional changes (see electoral results in Scotland and 
Catalonia in Tables 1 and 2). 
The lack of major political violence in these two nationalities is, 
moreover, highly significant. It indicates the absence both of strong intra-
communal social cleavages, as is the case in Northern Ireland, and of a 
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considerable section of the population ready to support the fight for self-
determination, by whatever means possible, as in the Basque Country. In 
any case, both forms of political nationalism share the perception that 
political violence would undoubtedly jeopardise social mobilisation and 
popular support for the cause of self-government. Moreover, the reformist 
character of such nationalisms is antagonistic to radical change. Neither 
have the policies of repression by their centralist states or the internal social 
climate reached the level of suffocating oppression or civil war as happened 
in the Basques Country and Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Differences. Setting aside electoral and institutional traditions, the 
stark difference between the Scottish and Catalan processes for gaining 
home rule rests upon their antithetical strategic approaches. The Scottish 
political class has tended to defend, in an inert manner, a political territorial 
pattern, a situation which did not exist in post-Franco Catalonia and which 
has also been greatly influenced by the dialectics of partisan competition 
and self-interest characteristics of British politics. 
TABLES 1: Percentages of popular votes in General Elections in Scotland 
since the Second World War. 
YEAR LABOUR CONSERVATIVE LIBERAL(*) SNP 
1945 47.3 36.3 9.0 1.2 
1950 46.1 44.8 6.6 0.4 
1951 47.8 48.6 2.7 0.3 
1955 46.7 50.1 1.8 0.5 
1959 46.6 47.2 4.0 0.5 
1964 48.7 40.6 7.6 2.4 
1966 49.9 37.6 6.8 5.0 
1970 44.5 38.0 5.5 12.8 
1974(Feb) 36.6 32.9 8.0 22.7 
1974(0ct) 36.3 24.7 8.3 30.6 
1979 41.5 31.4 9.0 17.1 
1983 35.1 28.4 24.5 11.8 
1987 42.4 24.0 19.2 14.0 
(*) The 1983 and 1987 results correspond to the SDP!Liberal Alliance. 
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TABLE 2: Percentages of popular votes in General and Catalan elections 
since 1977. 
YEAR PSC-PSOE CiU PSUC ERC AP UCD/CDS OTHERS 
1977 28.4 16.8 18.2 4.5 3.5 16.8 11.8 
(General) 
1979 29.2 16.1 17.0 4.1 3.6 19.0 8.8 
(General) 
1980 22.3 27.6 18.6 8.8 2.3 10.5 8.3 
(Catalan) 
1982 45.1 22.2 4.6 4.0 14.4 2.0/2.0 5.7 
(General) 
1984 30.0 46.6 5.5 4.4 7.7 5.8 
(Catalan) 
1986 41.0 32.0 3.9 2.7 11.4 4.1 4.9 
(General) 
PSC-PSOE: Catalan Socialist party federated to the Spanish PSOE 
CiU: Centre-right Catalan nationalist coalition 
PSUC: Catalan communists 
ERC: Centre-left Catalan nationalist party 
AP: Spanish conservative party 
UCD: Centrist coalition which disappeared after the 1982 General 
Election 
CDS: Centrist party created in 1982 
Thus, the achievement of home rule, which has been the concern of a 
majority of Scots, has always been subordinated to the priorities of each 
party. The Catalan forces, on the contrary, not having to break a territorial 
pattern of institutional power in post-Franco Catalonia, have sought and 
negotiated the articulation of a common strategy to make the re-
establishment of institutions of self-government after the demise of Francoist 
dictatorship possible. This pattern has followed the traditional inclination of 
the Catalan seny ("common sense") for negotiation and compromise, or 
pactisme<4l. 
(C) Social and Cultural 
Affinities. The concept of dual nationality, or compound nationality, is 
a common element of identification for a majority of Scots and Catalans (see 
results of survey polls on national identification by Scots and Catalans in 
Tables 3 and 4). Both peripheral nations have preserved a national identity, 
or quasi-nationhood, from pre-Union times and have also assimilated a post-
Union identity, a product of the process of malintegration in the British and 
Spanish state-building. 
A consequence of such pre-Union collective consciousness is the 
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employment of both Scottish mythology and the Catalan language as the 
main socio-cultural instruments in the forging of ethnical cohesiveness. 
Differences. The diverse nature of socio-cultural instruments has 
reinforced the assertive and reactive character of Scottish and Catalan 
nationalism. Not surprisingly, many of the Scottish myths for popular 
consumption deal with heroes like William Wallace or Robert the Bruce, or 
events like the battle of Bannockburn, rather than the egalitarian values 
developed in Scottish civil society since the union with England. The former 
emphasises Scotland's successful defence against the external English 
adversary, and contributes to feed, in turn, a certain sense of defensive 
"hopelessness" in national Scottish values vis-a-vis the "powerfulness" of the 
English ones<5l. 
TABLE 3: National identification by Scots (1986). 
Question: "We are interested to know how people living in Scotland 
see themselves in terms of their nationality. Which of the statements on this 
card best describes how you regard yourself?" 
% 
(1) Scottish, not British 39 
(2) More Scottish than British 30 
(3) Equally Scottish and British 19 
(4) More British than Scottish 4 
(5) British, not Scottish 6 
(Don't Know) 2 
(*) Those expressing a degree of dual nationality 54 
(*) Those expressing exclusive single nationality 46 
(*) Percentages have been rounded. "Don't Knows" have been ignored. 
Source: System Three Scotland, July 1986, see Appendix 2, Luis Moreno, 
(1986), Decentalisation in Britain and Spain. Ph.D. thesis, University of 
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TABLE 4: National identification by Catalans (1985). 
Question: "In which of these five categories do you include 
yourself?" 
% 
(1) I consider myself only Catalan 9 
(2) I consider myself more Catalan than Spanish 24 
(3) I consider myself as much Spanish as Catalan 47 
(4) I consider myself more Spanish than Catalan 7 
(5) I consider myself only Spanish 12 
(Don't Know) 1 
(*) Those expressing a degree of dual nationality 79 
(*) Those expressing exclusive single nationality 21 
(*) Percentages have been rounded. "Don't Knows" have been ignored. 
Source: ECO poll published in Cambia 16, no. 698. See Appendix 2, Luis 
Moreno (1986), ibid, p.442. 
The Catalan language, on the other hand, provides the means for a 
permanent re-assertion of Catalan ethno-cultural distinctiveness. The 
external adversary theory has also played, and continues to play, an 
important role in the articulation of political mobilisation in Catalonia. 
However, the emergence in the last decades of new outward-looking 
cultural forms, not exclusively tied to the pre-Union signs of identity, has 
brought about an active socio-cultural Catalan role in concurrence with 
other Spanish values. 
(D) Economic 
Affinities. The regional economies of Scotland and Catalonia have 
similar economic indicators as regards population (5.15 and 5.96 million, 
respectively), location (peripheral regions) and production (EEC GDP: 
1.5% and 1.4%). They have traditionally perceived themselves as 
discriminated by the core areas and political elites of their respective 
unitary states, ie. the Scottish perception of relative deprivation and the 
Catalan sense of comparative grievance. In other words, while a large 
sector of Scottish society is of the opinion that the English- especially those 
living in the South - are economically better off than the Scots, the 
Catalans' comparative grievance is based upon a feeling of being treated 
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unfavourably by the centre, or receiving less than they have given. These 
two popular perceptions have greatly fuelled the rise of modern 
nationalism in both peripheral nations. 
Differences. In relative terms, and taking into account both the British 
and the Spanish contexts, Scotland can be seen to be poorer and Catalonia 
richer. Growth of population, one simple indicator of the well-being of a 
country, illustrates this point. Whereas in 1931 the population of Scotland 
accounted for 12.1% of the UK total figures, in 1971 the percentage fell to 
10.7%. Catalonia's population, by contrast, climbed from 11.2% of the 
Spanish total in 1940 to 15.6% in 1974. 
However, as far as natural resources are concerned, the contrast is 
spectacular. North Sea oil, for example, provided £16bn of the gross 
revenue of the UK Treasury in 1982, while the very few natural resources in 
Catalonia amount to no more than some salt and lignite mines and a very 
small oil extraction off the coast of Tarragona. 
Although both countries have shared the recent experience of the 
increased penetration of multinational companies, their regional 
economies show dissimilarities with respect to their economic structures: 
specialised, in the case of Scotland, with large "uncompetitive" heavy 
industries which are in the gradual process of closure; and diversified, in the 
case of Catalonia, with production based on small firms and businesses. 
Paradoxically, the financial sector based in Edinburgh is very strong in 
comparison with the feebleness of Catalan local finances. 
In general terms, the "productive" sector of the Scottish regional 
economy relies upon the implementation of policies from above, basically 
through the provision of jobs and the creation of economic activities via 
British public expenditure. On the other hand, an entrepreneurial vocation 
developed by a petite bourgeoisie mentality makes the Catalan 
industrialists more likely to develop initiatives from below. These are on a 
small scale and are very adaptable to changing economic scenarios. 
Catalan experiences, future variables and the quest for Scottish Home Rule. 
The task of putting forward a systematic pattern of predictions is 
factually inaccessible rather than methodologically problematical. In this 
section we will seek to induce a political situation through which self-
government in Scotland can be achieved and exercised in the foreseeable 
future and which has proved to be effective in the light of the Catalan 
experience. In any case, a climate of political consensus is the sine-qua-non 
requirement prior to any further development. 
It needs to be said, however, that the prospect of political agreement 
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is rather unfamiliar in the competitive complexion of the British political 
system. Perhaps the whole idea of a political convention is regarded as 
strange in Britain because of the preoccupation with parliamentary 
sovereignty- itself evidence of the archaic nature of the British state -and 
the failure to develop a doctrine of popular sovereignty. 
However, some variables are considered to be highly important in any 
future development concerned with Scottish self-government: 
(1) SNP electoral revival. This is a "compelling" variable which could 
provoke an expedient response by the British parties to the rapid setting up 
of a Scottish Assembly or Parliament. This new hypothetical electoral 
upsurge of the SNP in a medium-term future would need the concurrence of 
two other main sub-variables: 
( 1 ,a) An increase in both the economic decline of Britain and in the sense 
of relative deprivation felt in Scotland. 
In general, the trend of relative economic decline in Britain has 
been steady since the end of World War Two. This decline has taken 
place amidst a rapid increase in the economic expansion of other 
industrial countries. In 1955, for instance, the United Kingdom was 
fifth in the world league of income per head. In 1981 the UK GNP 
per capita was $9,000, 26th in the world behind countries like the 
Federal Republic of Germany ($13,450 and 9th), France ($12,190 
and 16th) or Japan ($10,080 and 25th). 
Some authors predict that if present trends continue, Britain will be 
overtaken by countries like Spain in the mid-term future and that 
the British economy will not reach the present level of the national 
income in the Federal Republic of Germany unti12051(6l. 
The classical free-liberal market and supply-side monetarist policies 
developed by the Thatcher Governments have. severely damaged 
the traditional "lameduck" heavy industries located in Scotland, but 
have served very appropriately the ethnocentrist interest of British 
capital based in the City. This financial industry has simply 
disregarded investments in the North of Britain and has 
concentrated mainly on speculative operations overseas - namely, 
US financial markets- or in investment ventures in the South East 
of England. 
This sense of relative deprivation could certainly be channelled in 
electoral terms through an instrumentalist vote for the SNP, 
together with a wide support for Labour which, as the 1987 General 
Election has proved, also receives in Scotland a large proportion of 
the so-called "protest vote" articulated against the English Tory 
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policies which are aimed at favouring the Conservative strongholds 
in the South of England. 
(1 ,b) An SNP effective strategy and charismatic leadership. The Jack of 
charismatic leadership has been a feature universal to all the parties 
operating in Scotland at least in the last twenty years - with the 
quasi-exception perhaps of the cases of John Mackintosh, Jim 
Sillars and Winnie Ewing. This lack of leadership is an element 
which highly conditions the nature of social mobilisation for self-
government in Scotland. 
In this respect the "Billy Wolfe affair" can be cited as a very 
illustrative one. The fact that the chairman of the SNP was "able" to 
alienate, with his comments in 1982, the important Catholic 
minority in a country where religious bigotry still exists in some 
areas causes more than perplexity. The view that a democratic and 
participatory structure, combined with the strong commitment of 
the SNP membership, does very little to compensate for the absence 
of charismatic leadership and the tactics-strategies confusion over 
Party goals has to be stressed. 
Indeed, the passive political attitude of the Scots might be 
galvanised by the presence of a charismatic political leadership like 
that of Jordi Pujol in Catalonia. This factor is essential for the 
breaking of the ingrained attitude of political defeatism and 
institutional solidarity so characteristic of some Scottish political 
culture. 
(2) The "conversion" of Scottish Labour to self-government. Labour 
has traditionally failed to assimilate the fact that political decentralisation 
mounts per se a democratic challenge to the structure of a capitalist state 
which, in the case of Britain, uses the practices of economic corporatism 
and political centralisation to maintain its supremacy. Labour, on the other 
hand, should no longer hold the populist view of attacking the self-interest 
of Welsh and Scottish nationalisms while, at the same time, deploying the 
same kind of English-British nationalist self-interest in attacking the EEC 
in the European Parliament. 
The alleged defensive mood of Scottish politics finds in the case of 
Labour the compliance of a political leadership most unwilling to use 
political mobilisation to pursue the democratic principle of self-
government. 
In any possible future, however, the political fortunes of Scottish home 
rule would very much depend on the attitude of the Labour membership in 
Scotland and, as a result of this, on the willingness of Scottish Labour 
leaders to operate also in the Scottish dimension of British politics, rather 
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than exclusively aiming their territorial interests at gaining institutional 
power in London. 
In Catalonia, the label "national" or "nationalist" cannot be claimed 
solely by the parties which explicitly define themselves as such. Both 
socialist PSC and communist PSUC are not only Catalan national 
organisations but were also main catalysts and protagonists in the process of 
political negotiation aimed at the re-establishment of home rule in 
Catalonia. 
In contrast with some of their European counterparts, notably the 
British Labour Party, the Spanish socialist PSOE has traditionally had a 
strong anti-centralist tradition and federalist vocation. 
(3) The transformation of the British state .. The issue of Scottish self-
government is very closely related to the content and form of any future 
social transformation in the British state. The trend of political 
backwardness in Britain, which has encompassed the loss of the Empire 
and progressive economic decline, has seen an increased paternalist 
centralisation in the last decades since World War Two. This situation has 
been described as follows: 
"We Jive in an archaic political society ... The British state is to be 
defined as an ancien regime closer in the spirit to the monarchy 
overthrown in 1789 than to the republican constitutions which 
followed in France and elsewhere in Europe ... The reason that the 
British economy does not work is that British institutions are in 
terminal decay"<7l. 
The failure of the democratic parliamentarian system in the industrial 
state has been caused, amongst other factors, by its problems to function 
spatially in large communities (ie. nation-state). 
The fate of any social transformation within the Br·itish state is closely 
related to the creation of geographical, political and cultural communities 
through which civil society can determine the mechanisms of participation. 
This opposition to centralist corporatism, a feature common to other 
Western European states, cannot simply rely on the appearance of 
spontaneous "unhistorical" upsurges of social mobilisation (eg. May 68), 
but must rely on the developments of self-governed activities which reject 
the technocratic solutions and the tutelar role of the "paternalist" industrial 
state. 
(4) A political convention for Scottish Home Rule. The means by 
which an institutionalised form of self-government can be achieved in 
Scotland from the point of view of its "desirability" takes into account two 
crucial premises: 
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(a) The product of broadly agreed proposals of home rule will inevitably 
respond to a broad desire for self-government expressed by the Scots. 
(b) The social mobilisation which would follow the political agreement by 
the political parties in Scotland on the form and content of the home 
rule proposals would confer a character of irreversibility to the whole 
political process. 
The most desirable and workable form of self-government in Scotland 
is provided by the process of negotiation and agreement among those 
parties representing the broad majority of the Scottish electorate. A 
political convention, encouraged by a cross-party organisation like the 
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, or another of similar characteristics, 
would provide the means for discussion and agreement on the kind of 
assembly/parliament to which the Scots aspire. 
In Catalonia, the Assemblea de Catalunya, set up in 1971, genuinely 
reflected the struggles against both dictatorship and centralist rule. Its 
activities followed a simple four-point programme which included the 
recovery of Catalan Home Rule. This Assembly of Catalonia gathered 
together Liberals, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Socialists, 
Communists, trade unionists, urban community associations, university 
groups, intellectuals and ordinary people in a clandestine and highly 
representative movement of opposition to Franco's regime in Catalonia. 
More importantly, it started the practice of inter-party discussion and 
negotiation which subsequently proved to be essential in the task of 
wording the Autonomy Statute for Catalonia. 
In Scotland, some Scots still believe that devolution has something to 
do with the total secession of Scotland from the rest of Britain. So, the 
constitutional convention would have the goal, among others, of publicly 
debating the differing views of the various parties on the home rule issue. 
Were the SNP to put forward the claim "independence-nothing-less" in the 
negotiations of the political convention, the Scottish population at large 
would be able to distinguish more clearly between the arrangements for 
home rule and those for complete secession. 
Once the content and form of the proposals had been broadly 
discussed and agreed to in the Scottish convention, the legislative 
procedure should start in Westminster. At this point the biggest question 
would be raised: Would MPs at Westminster, with their "own" territorial 
constituencies, allow the Scots whatever they wanted? ... 
In such a situation, the role of the Scottish Labour MPs would be 
crucial. As was said before, any form of home-rule to be achieved in 
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elected in Scottish constituencies. 
Proceeding to a Scottish Convention 
The best-positioned body to call on for political negotiations over the 
setting up of both a Scottish Assembly and an Executive would be a cross-
party organisation. Once a cross-party organisation like the CSA was 
accepted as convener body by the representative parties, the next step 
would be a constituent meeting with the political representatives of their 
respective parties. This aspect is not merely formal: in order to avoid pre-
judgements about the way the Convention should operate, the constituent 
parties would be the ones who decided upon the working methodology to 
be adopted. The role of the convener would subsequently be that of taking 
charge of the provision of the material elements needed for the proceedings 
of the Convention. The convener would, consequently, become the 
instrumental body which would put into practice the decisions taken by the 
Scottish Convention. 
To say that the political parties should be the constituent parts of the 
Convention is not to deny their own prerogative to consider the inclusion or 
not in the Convention of other representative Scottish "voices" (eg. Local 
Authorities, STUC, Chambers of Commerce and Industry and/or 
representatives of the major religious organisations). The parties, by the 
very expression of their political will, would accept the "operational" 
legitimacy ofthe Convention and so, the result of the negotiations would be 
one of a tacit consensus assumed by the parties involved. 
The goal of a Scottish Convention can only be realized by the prior 
assumption made by the political parties that an institutional form of self-
government for Scotland can be achieved by consent and, in so doing, 
reflecting the electoral preferences of the Scots for those parties advocating 
home rule for Scotland. If we take into account the 1987 General Election 
results we should stress the fact that 85% of all MPs elected in Scotland are 
members of political parties advocating some form of Scottish self-
government (ie. Labour, Alliance and SNP). 
In the eventuality of political agreement being reached, and being 
widely embraced by the parties involved in the Convention, the next step 
would be constituted by the formal acceptance of the constitutional 
proposals by the Scottish Grand Committee. 
Finally, and in order to make the whole process workable, the political 
agreement reached within the Scottish Convention would accomplish one 
priority goal: 
-The constituent parties would agree not only on the content and form 
of the proposals, but would explicitly pursue social mobilisation in order to 
178 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1988 
implement them. That is, a new popular referendum on the text containing 
the proposals agreed in the Scottish convention would be held before the 
implementation of such legislative provisions. 
Catalonia, a referential example and a precedent. 
The afore-mentioned proposals are not original per se. This is to say, 
they have already been attempted succesfully in Catalonia, a country with a 
context similar to that of Scotland. Indeed, the process in Spain of 
decentralisation and regional autonomy in which nationalities and regions 
participated in the framing of their own statutes offers a remarkable 
example. 
In Spain, after the 1977 Spanish General Election, 80% of the Catalan 
elected candidates to the Congreso de los Diputados (Lower House of the 
Spanish Parliament), and all but one of the elected candidates to the 
Senado (Upper House) were committed to Catalan Home-Rule. 
Most certainly in post-Franco Catalonia the achievement of home rule 
was a political priority for all major political parties, regardless of other 
ideological cleavages. A few days after the 1977 General Election, the 
Assemblea dels Parlamentaris (Assembly of Parliamentarians) first met in 
Barcelona to start on the wording of the Statute of Autonomy. On 29th 
December 1978, during the final vote on the draft of the Statute Bill 
finalised in the town of Sau (Girona), there were no votes against the 
drafted text in the Assemblea dels Parlamentaris and only one abstention. 
Very significantly, the drafted Catalan Autonomy Statute involved the 
active presence of the Conservative MP, Laureano Lopez Rod6, a 
prominent minister in Franco's government during the 1960s. 
The Bill of the Autonomy Statute for Catalonia was debated in the 
Spanish Joint Parliamentary Committee which was composed of the 
members of the Constitutional Committee of the Congreso de los 
Diputados (34 votes in favour, I against and 1 abstention) and the Catalan 
Assembly of Parliamentarians (21 affirmative and 1 abstention). On 
October 25, 1979, 88.1% of the Catalan vote (52.6% of the registered 
electorate) voted affirmatively for the implementation of the Autonomy 
Statute. The turnout was 59.7% of which 7.7% were "No" votes, 3.5% 
Blank votes and 0.5% spoiled votes. On 30th November and 12th 
December, respectively the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados (317 MPs 
in favour, 1 against and 13 abstentions) and the Senado (168 MPs in favour, 
1 against and 3 abstentions) ratified the provisions of the Catalan 
Autonomy Statute. The Royal Assent was given on December 18, 1979. On 
17th January 1980, the provisions of the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia 
were fully put into effect, after their publication in the Spanish Official 
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Conclusion 
It is simplistic to believe that historical events and processes can 
operate in the same way and with the same results in different countries but, 
having said that, Scotland and Catalonia have so many features in common 
that it would also be unrealistic to deny beforehand a similar result in their 
respective paths to home rule. 
There are global trends to decentralisation in the Western world. In 
fact, the centralisation/decentralisation debate has usually remained 
isolated on the political fringe of the discussion of the efficiency versus 
inefficiency of state institutions in the provision of public goods. Such 
marginal treatment minimises the comprehensive study of the formation 
(state building and national integration) of the modern states, the 
intergovernmental relations within its boundaries, the crisis in the 
legitimacy of its political institutions ( eg. Parliament and representative 
democracy) and the impact of the internationalisation of capital in the 
"post-industrial" state. 
Power has an inherent territorial dimension: it cannot be abstracted 
from its geographical component. The development of industrial society 
inevitably involved a reallocation of the spatial division of power. Since the 
Industrial Revolution, and due mainly to a marked increase in the volume 
and scope of government activity, power has been progressively allocated 
according to meaningful geographical criteria. As a consequence, the issues 
"dispersion-concentration", "central-local relations" and "state 
homogenization-regional diversity" have become crucial for both the 
configuration of the state institutions and the social transformations which 
can take place within the state. 
Diverse economic, cultural and political factors are leading to the 
recognition of pluralist centres of decision-making. In this respect, 
Scotland and Catalonia may represent the future of decentralised political 
structures. In other words, decentralisation needs to provide a deepening 
of democracy by means of a more effective access by civil society to political 
decision-making, something which in the case of minority nations like 
Scotland and Catalonia overlaps with their ethnic/cultural/economic 
dimension. 
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